Sellars takes it that this claim states a structural feature of the manifest image. It is, note, incompatible with intentionalism or disjunctivism about perception—views that reject the idea that there is a nonconceptual component in perception—which Sellars would think are confused about the place of sensible qualities in the manifest image.
The grain argument is meant to cut off reductive replies to these questions.
The notion of a reduction must also be specified, for it is notoriously multivalent. But the proper sensibles are not reducible in this way to the properties and relations of micro-objects. Sense impressions are posited to explain how systems of particles appear the way they do; they cannot themselves turn out to be another kind of system of particles, or the explanation fails.
If this argument is right, then the postulation of sense impressions must differ in some important ways from the kind of theoretical postulation that typically results in a belief in new microentities. And this is what Sellars argues. Sellars holds, then, that the logical space of the sensible qualities has been successively recategorized in different stages of human development.
Wilfrid Sellars (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
He proposes that this history will take one more turn as science develops further: unable to reduce or eliminate the sensibles, science will postulate a distinctive set of entities, sensa , to be the final embodiment of the sensible qualities, physical 1 but not physical 2. Sellars is a physicalist about color, not because he thinks colors can be reduced to more basic properties and relations of physical objects, but because physics will have to expand to accommodate the sensible qualities, color included, as primitive entities.
See Rosenberg and deVries , Chapter 8, for more exploration of this issue. Sellars was a significant philosopher of science and a staunch defender of scientific realism. We can start with the distinction between observational and theoretical vocabularies. Many empiricists were wedded to the myth of the given, assuming that there is a privileged observation vocabulary.
The meanings of observation terms were determined by their relation to what is given and were thus unrevisable or incorrigible. This vocabulary grounds the meaning of all empirical language. Two kinds of generalizations were recognized: 1 empirical generalizations formulated in the observation language and justified by straightforward inductive methods, and 2 higher-level generalizations formulated in a more abstract, theoretical idiom including novel theoretical posits.
This theoretical language consists of terms invented in order to better organize, generalize, and make connections among the assertions and generalizations made in the observation language. The ideal would be a formal axiomatic structure that would allow a deduction of the empirical generalizations which, combined with statements of initial conditions, permit a deduction of particular empirical facts thus explaining their truth.
We are committed to the existence of the given, for that is what ties thought to reality. Theories, however, are merely tools to enable us to explain observation-level empirical generalizations. Presumably, some empirical generalizations may be first derived with the help of a theory, but they are subject to more direct investigation and corroboration, so the theory is not essential to it.
Thus, there is no ontological commitment to any entities that theories postulate; they can be viewed as convenient fictions, devices of calculation. Sellars thinks that this instrumentalist picture gets almost everything wrong. There is no given, so it can play no semantic role. Meanings are functional roles in language usage, and nothing in principle prevents a term that might originally have arisen as part of a theory from acquiring a role in observation reports.
Furthermore, what is observable depends on the techniques and instruments employed, and these are often loaded with theoretical baggage. A good theory, according to Sellars, does not just explain the observation-level empirical generalizations, it also explains why those empirical generalizations are as good and as wrong as they are. The Boyle-Charles ideal gas law works well in most conditions, but does not predict the behavior of gasses under extreme temperatures or pressures.
The van der Waals equation, explicitly formulated with the theory of statistical thermodynamics in mind, allows us to see why the Boyle-Charles law is as good as it is and why it breaks down where it does. Thus, to have good reason to accept a theory is to have good reason to believe in the existence of those entities it postulates. But this needs proper interpretation.
Prescribing, evaluating, and negotiating are equally indispensable dimensions of language use in which science is not privileged. Sellars also has a distinctive treatment of scientific laws. Laws are standardly treated as generalizations; they are distinguished from accidental generalizations because laws have a modal force capable of supporting counterfactuals.
Though they have descriptive content, statements of laws serve a different function in our language. As mentioned above, Sellars treats modals uniformly as material-mode metalinguistic speech expressing the inferential commitments and priorities embedded in the language.
So, saying that it is a law of nature that e. Furthermore, Sellars does not think of language as a fixed entity. Indeed, in his conception, the job of the sciences is to methodically revise and replace the resources available for description and explanation. Conceptual change is the very essence of science. In his view, laws of nature are proposed connections among concepts or terms that, pending possible empirical disconfirmation, can be rationally attached to the concepts.
Epistemology tries to make intelligible the acquisition, growth, and change of belief. It thus tends to focus on the input to and internal interactions of our cognitive states. Action theory, in contrast, focuses on the output side, accounting for the intelligibility of action. Sellars has a sophisticated and systematic approach to action theory and normativity that has not been widely appreciated. A central role is played by the notion of an intention. An intention is a thought that motivates one to realize its content.
Expressing an intention or volition is not the same as self- ascribing an intention or volition, nor are such expressions descriptions of intentions or predictions of action. Expressions of intention are always first-personal in form and essentially tied to motivational force.
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This distinguishes him from Hare, who thought it was imperatives that underlay our concept of practical reason. The major principle governing intentions is. But there is no expression of the lack of an intention to do A, so. A description of an intention, however, is different from an expression of it. Sellars invokes a principle that governs how the facts of the world are to be taken up into our practical reasoning. A fairly straightforward picture of practical reasoning emerges. Thus C[onjunction] I[ntroduction] together with So-be-it, takes our separate purposes and relevant beliefs and puts them together into encompassing alternatives:.
Clearly, the elaboration of alternatives is a rational process. Is making the ultimate choice among these alternatives also a matter of reason?
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In what sense is the choice among fully elaborated alternatives anything other than an arbitrary, personal choice? It applies to the deontic modalities as well: they signal the endorsement of certain practical inferences and principles. We can see this clearly in his treatment of hypothetical oughts. An important fact about statements of the form. The choices we make are, effectively, always of encompassing alternatives, but the considerations we bring to bear on those choices are always only partial.
To offer advice of the form. For a moral ought, we would seek a categorically reasonable intention, one that would be reasonable for anyone and everyone to have.
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Sellars approaches the search for a categorically reasonable intention in several steps. In order to make intelligible such universality in form, Sellars introduces the notion of a we-intention, an intention that is not the merely subjective possession of an individual, but an intention had as a member of a group that constitutes us.
There can be things I intend, as one of us , that I do not or would not intend, speaking on my own behalf. For instance, I might intend, as a citizen of the U.
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Sellars thus suggests that the we-intention. While he thinks the first is plausible, Sellars does not claim to have an argument for the second, so the question of the reality of the moral community remains problematic. Rules, he thinks, are distinctively human. The language of individual and community intentions that Sellars claims must be preserved in the Peircean scientific millenium is the language that enables us to make sense of rules.